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DEFINING AND MEASURING THE SUCCESS 






Services acquisition in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has continued to increase 
in scope and dollars in the past decade.  The DoD has spent more on services, 
approximately 57% of total acquisition expenditures and nearly a third of the total DoD 
budget, than on supplies, equipment, and goods together.  As a result, the agency must 
give greater attention to the management of services acquisition.  Stakeholder theory 
illustrates how acquisition team members often have conflicting goals and objectives, 
leading to differing definitions and measurements of a successful service contact. We 
used stakeholder theory to address the following questions: (1) how are successful service 
contracts within the DoD being defined by different stakeholders; (2) how are service 
contracts being measured within the DoD by different stakeholders; and (3) how should 
service contracts be defined and measured within the DoD. We conducted 41 interviews 
and surveys of key stakeholders.  Our findings reveal no standardized definition or 
measurement for the success of service contracts.  However, some salient characterstics 
of definitions are staying on schedule, maintaining costs, and having well-defined 
requirements.  With respect to measurements, relevant characteristics included 
performance and cost.  Based on these findings, we provide recommendations on 
establishing standardized definitions and measurements of success. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Over the last few decades, Department of Defense (DoD) service contracts have 
increased in dollar value. Relative to supply contracts, services acquisition has continued to 
grow in terms both of dollar value and of range of acquisitions.  This trend is shown in 
Figure 1 (Rendon, Apte, & Apte, 2012). This figure demonstrates that between fiscal year 
(FY) 2000 and FY2010, growth in service contracts more than doubled. Contract obligations 
rose to over $387 billion in 2008, with nearly $200 billion spent on services alone (Hutton & 
Solis, 2009).  As such, a management and oversight plan, and clearly defined metrics for 
successful service contracts are important.   
 
Figure 1.   DoD Contracts for Goods and Services  
(Rendon, Apte, & Apte, 2012) 
 
Figure 2 clearly demonstrates this growing trend in service contract expenditures.  
Funding spent on service contracts grew steadily from 1990–2010, constituting roughly 42% 
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services contracts.  Notably, service contracts showed the highest growth in percentage of 
expenditures over the last 21 years, with a rise of nearly 6.1% annually (Ellman, Livergood, 
Morrow, & Sanders, 2011). An in-depth study of services acquisition will help develop 





Figure 2.   Growth in DoD Service Contract Expenditures 
(Ellman et al., 2011) 
 
The definition and measurement of successful service contracts should align with the 
overarching initiatives, as illustrated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]).  The USD(AT&L) outlined these initiatives in his 
June 2010 memorandum on acquisition efficiency. In his memorandum, he noted that the 
Department of Defense currently spends nearly $400 billion out of its $700 billion budget on 
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billion over the next five fiscal years.  The USD(AT&L) describes this initiative in terms of 
an efficiency and cost-effectiveness overhaul.  The DoD, according to the USD(AT&L), has 
the potential of increasing its warfighter capability by 2–3% annually, without future budget 
increases.  In addition, identifying and cutting unproductive or low-value programs and 
contracts will free up funding to transfer to more productive warfighter programs.  The 
USD(AT&L) states that the United States is entering a period of budget reform, stunting the 
budget growth of the previous decade. The ability to properly manage and access every 
service contract is essential to reduce inefficiencies and eliminate nonperformance, and, 
consequentially, to achieve the level of savings required by the DoD savings initiative 
(USD[AT&L], 2010).   
B. PURPOSE 
Our purpose with this research was to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the 
definition and metrics of a successful service contract from the perspective of various 
stakeholders.  Our primary data collection method was interviews conducted with DoD 
stakeholders.  With our research, we determined if the stakeholders define and measure the 
success of service contracts differently.  The results of this project support ongoing research 
being conducted by the Acquisition Research Program at the Naval Postgraduate School 
concerning the DoD’s management of service contracts (Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 2010). 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
With our research, we attempt to answer the following questions as they relate to the 
definition and measurement of successful service contracts within the DoD, and as 
determined by the different identified stakeholders: 
1. How are successful service contracts within the DoD being defined by 
different stakeholders? 
2. How are service contracts being measured within the DoD by different 
stakeholders? 
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D. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
In addition to identifying how stakeholders currently define and measure the success 
of service contracts, we aim to provide key information to develop sound protocols and 
metrics for future service contract success.  By determining how each stakeholder within the 
DoD defines a successful service contract, we endeavor to distinguish the key driving factors 
of service contract success that lead to greater performance and savings.     
This research was limited by the sample size and scope of the population of 
stakeholders interviewed.  Of the numerous organizations within the DoD, a small percentage 
of these stakeholders participated in the research.   
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research utilized a web-based survey, telephone interviews, and personal 
interviews of the various stakeholders within DoD service contract activities.  The survey 
consisted of two open-ended questions and three demographic questions.  We conducted a 
review of the literature on service contract management and stakeholder theory.  We then 
developed a survey to investigate the definition and measurement of successful service 
contracts.  The survey was deployed across three contracting commands within the Navy.  
The responses of all participants were analyzed and examined for differences and 
commonalities.  We then developed conclusions and provided recommendations for the 
definition and measurement of a successful service contract process.  Finally, we analyzed 
and examined the results to identify and categorize how stakeholders define and measure 
successful service contracts.   
F. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This report is organized into five chapters. In Chapter I, we include background 
information, the purpose of the research, our research questions, the benefits and limitations 
of the research, and the research methodology.  In Chapter II, we review past and current 
literature on the services contracting process.  We describe the members of the acquisition 
team, their roles and responsibilities, as well as their goals and objectives.  We then identify 
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Accountability Office (GAO) and Inspector General (IG) findings.   Further, we present the 
research on stakeholder theory and how it relates to the service contract management process.  
In Chapter III, we outline our research methodology, which includes our data collection and 
analytical process.  In Chapter IV, we examine and analyze the research findings.  In Chapter 
V, we provide the summary, conclusions, and areas for further research.   
G. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we provided background information on service acquisition within the 
DoD, the purpose of the report, our research questions, the benefits and limitations of our 
research, and the methodology and organization of the report.  The information we provided 
outlined the objectives described by the USD(AT&L) and how these objectives relate to the 
definition and measurement of successful service contracts.  The research questions are the 
primary focus of this report. In Chapter II, we review past and current literature on the 
service contracting process, the acquisition team, roles and responsibilities of service 
acquisition personnel, goals and objectives of service acquisition personnel, deficiencies in 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter I, we established the foundation of this research.  In Chapter II, we 
introduce past and current literature on the service contracting process, the acquisition team, 
roles and responsibilities of service acquisition personnel, goals and objectives of service 
acquisition personnel, deficiencies in service contracts, and stakeholder theory.    
B. SERVICE CONTRACTING PROCESS 
Service contract management is defined as the art and science of managing an 
agreement throughout the process of contracting (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  The contract 
management process can be described utilizing a six-step model.  Following is the list of 
phases within the process and the key activities of each phase: 
1. Procurement Planning: Identification of which organization or business needs 
can be best achieved by procurement of services or products external to the 
organization. Key activities include determining the scope of work; 
completing market research, technology analysis, and funding determination; 
and creating estimates for cost and schedule. 
2. Solicitation Planning: Preparation of solicitation documentation to support the 
acquisition. Key activities include using standardized forms, model contracts, 
specifications and descriptions of items, and terms and conditions of the 
contract. 
3. Solicitation: Obtaining bids and proposals from prospective contractors on 
how to meet the objectives of the service contract. Pertinent activities include 
conducting advertising to identify new sources and compiling a list of 
interested offerors. 
4. Source Selection: Receipt of proposed bids and application of selection 
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include using evaluation criteria centered on management, technical, and cost 
factors and considering an offeror’s past performance in evaluating proposals. 
5. Contract Administration: Ensuring that each supplier’s performance is in 
accordance with contractual requirements.  Key activities include employing 
an integrated team approach to monitor the contractor’s cost, schedule, and 
performance.  Additionally, this phase includes establishing a process for 
administering incentives for award fee provisions. 
6. Contract Closeout: Validation of administrative matters pertaining to 
completed contracts. Activities unique to this phase include using checklists 
and forms for documentation of closed contracts and maintaining lessons 
learned and best practices for use in future contracts (Rendon & Garrett, 
2005). 
The outlined activities and steps in the service contract process are performed by the 
various members of the acquisition team, as discussed in the next section.   
C. THE ACQUISITION TEAM 
Throughout the federal acquisition service contracting process, the vision is to deliver 
the best value to the customer in a timely manner, while maintaining the public’s trust and 
fulfilling public policy objectives (FAR, 2012). The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
further delineates that all the participants in the acquisition process should work together as a 
team and should be empowered to make decisions within their area of responsibility (FAR, 
2012).  The FAR defines the acquisition team as consisting of all participants in government 
acquisition, including not only representatives of the technical, supply, and procurement 
communities, but also the customers they serve and the contractors who provide the products 
and services (FAR, 2012).  According to the FAR, the role of each member of the acquisition 
team is to exercise personal initiative and sound business judgment in providing the best 
value product or service to meet the customer’s needs (FAR, 2012).  These team members 
can be senior agency leaders, government personnel, administrative employees, and even 
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Many commercial organizational structures have incorporated the use of cross-
functional teams in an effort to improve communication, coordination, and collaboration 
among the team (Monczka, Handfield, Giunipero, & Patterson, 2011).  The DoD implements 
the cross-functional team through the use of an Integrated Product Team (IPT).  It is useful to 
note that the IPT is primarily used in contracting for products to facilitate the process of 
meeting cost, performance, and schedule objectives from product concept through 
production, including field support (“Integrated Product Team (IPT),” n.d.).  In service 
contracting the IPT is a team composed of representatives from appropriate functional 
disciplines working together to identify and resolve issues; make sound, timely 
recommendations in an effort to facilitate decision-making; and build successful programs 
that meet the warfighter’s needs  (“IPT,” n.d.).     
This research examines the internal members who could be considered stakeholders 
of the acquisition, specifically the program manager (PM), principal contracting officer 
(PCO), and contracting officer representative (COR).   
1. Project Manager 
The project management profession is principally represented by the Project 
Management Institute (PMI) and the International Project Management Association (IPMA); 
each group has its own representative professional certification (Garrett, 2010). Project 
management is defined as the centralized, coordinated management of a program to achieve 
the program’s strategic objectives and benefits (PMI, 2008). For the purposes of this report, 
the project manager is termed program manager (PM).  The PM has the ultimate 
responsibility for all cost, schedule, and technical aspects of the program (Deneault & 
Stambaugh, 2000, p. 22).  A PM’s responsibilities cut across multiple acquisition functional 
areas (e.g., business, contracting, facilities engineering, information technology, life cycle 
logistics, quality, systems planning) as well as knowledge in other technical areas (Krieger, 
2011a, p. 24).  In most companies, PMs serve as multifunctional team leaders on one or more 
projects, responsible for achieving the desired results for the projects (Garrett, 2010).  
However, most PMs lack the authority to sign, modify, or cancel contracts that legally bind 
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responsible for identifying the requirements; managing the project processes; and planning, 
monitoring, and executing the project.  Further, the PM is accountable for addressing the 
various needs, concerns, and expectations of the stakeholders as the project is planned and 
executed (PMI, 2008).  In carrying out the role of PM, various constraints must be balanced.  
The most common constraints are the following: scope, quality, schedule, budget, resources, 
and risk (PMI, 2008).  These are often competing constraints as the project progresses.  The 
scope is defined as the work that needs to be accomplished to deliver the service.  Included in 
the scope is the management plan, the description of how the project will be managed and 
controlled as well as a baseline that is compared to the actual results.  Quality is the results 
toward which the constraints are driving.  The schedule is the sequence of activities and 
duration to complete the service.  The budget is managing, estimating, and controlling costs 
of the service.  Resources refer to the human personnel constraint that must be managed.  In 
all projects, risk must be identified, monitored, and managed.  All of these common 
constraints and their interdependencies are best illustrated in the project management 
triangle, shown in Figure 3.  Each side represents a constraint.  These three constraints often 
compete: increased scope typically means increased time and increased cost, a tight time 
constraint could mean increased costs and reduced scope, and a tight budget could mean 
increased time and reduced scope (Sekhar, 2010).  The DoD 5000 Series is a regulatory 
document that provides guidance and policy for the management of defense acquisitions.  
Program management is the management of all of the project goals and objectives, while 
honoring the preconceived constraints as well as ensuring compliance with the 5000 Series 
directives in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (Krieger, 2011a).  
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According to A Guide to Best Practices for Contract Administration, program 
management activities include planning, organizing, securing, and managing resources to 
achieve specific goals (Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 1994). The PM adapts to 
various internal procedures of the contracting process and forms close links with the various 
stakeholders. To achieve client satisfaction, it is essential that the PM realize key issues of 
cost, schedule, and performance.  In government acquisition, the PM should obtain integrated 
cost and schedule performance data at an appropriate level in order to monitor program 
execution.  The PM should require contractors and government activities to use internal 
management control systems that accomplish the following:  
 relate time-phased budgets to specific tasks identified in the statement of 
work; 
 produce data that indicate work progress; 
 properly relate cost, schedule, and technical accomplishment; and  
 produce data that are valid, timely, and auditable. (USD[AT&L]), 2008)  
In government acquisition the PM is ultimately accountable to the end user and 
Congress.  Therefore, the PM activities include extensive coordination with internal and 
external stakeholders (Deneault & Stambaugh, 2000, p. 23).  The PM owns the acquisition 
strategy which drives the acquisition plan (Krieger, 2011a, p. 42).  This strategy shall be in 
writing and prepared in accordance with all the requirements of subpart 7.1. of the FAR 
(2012).  The strategy is the PM’s overall plan for satisfying the mission need in the most 
effective, economical, and timely manner, so before there is a contract, the PM owns the 
acquisition strategy that the contracting officer will seek to implement (Krieger, 2011b, p. 
42). 
In government acquisition, PMs are seen as successful if they continue to perpetuate 
their program through the acquisition life cycle.  This focus tends to take precedence over 
reporting realistic program status.  PMs are, by nature, becoming program advocates.  A 
PM’s future assignments and promotions depend on the success of the program, and it 
becomes very difficult for the PM to “blow the whistle,” hoping that they will be transferred 
before the true costs of the project become known (Fox, Hirsch, Krikorian, & Schumacher, 
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serious problems with a program can significantly jeopardize congressional and Office of the 
Secretary of Defense support for the program (Krieger, 2011a).  PMs sometimes lack realism 
and have undue optimism; a program cancellation or reduction in scope is perceived by 
service superiors as a PM’s failure. Therefore, a conflict exists between reporting realistic 
program status and doing what is necessary to keep programs funded and moving through the 
acquisition life cycle (Fox et al., 1994).  
2. Principal Contracting Officer 
The contract management profession is represented by three professional 
associations: the National Contract Management Association (NCMA), the Institute for 
Supply Management (ISM), and the International Association of Contract and Commercial 
Management (IACCM).  Each group has its own professional certifications (Garrett, 2010).  
Contract management is a career field that takes significant on-the-job training to become 
truly competent (Deneault & Stambaugh, 2000, p. 21).  Only a few educational institutions 
offer degrees or professional certificates in government contract management, and education 
does not always equate to experience (Deneault & Stambaugh, 2000, p. 21) A contract 
manager must be able to integrate functional inputs into a solicitation and the resulting 
contract (Krieger, 2011a, p. 25).  Despite the fact that contract managers are seldom 
responsible for daily project planning or operation, they are authorized to enter their 
organizations into legally binding contractual arrangements (Garrett, 2010).  Contract 
managers must be able to examine the contractual meaning of pre-contractual events and 
documents.  Contract managers must discern the objectives, needs, limitations, and even 
prejudices of other stakeholders (Hirsch, 1986).  When a contract manager has this 
sensitivity, the contract manager can reduce strife and gain empathy towards other members 
of the acquisition team (Hirsch, 1986).  A contract manager must have the skills to answer 
the following questions: (1) What is the work? (2) What are and where do we find the skills 
to perform the tasks? and (3) How do we ensure the work is done effectively at the lowest 
price (Cohen & Eimicke, 2008)?  Most organizations empower one or more employees in the 
role of contract management, and in some agencies a relatively small number of high-level 
officials are designated contracting managers solely by virtue of their positions (National 
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referred to in contract law as the agent; the source of authority is referred to as the principal 
(Garrett, 2010).  In DoD contracting this agent is called the principal contracting officer 
(PCO) and the principal is the federal government.  PCOs have the sole authority of the 
government to legally bind, enter into, administer, and terminate contracts and make related 
determinations and findings.  PCOs may bind the government only to the extent of the 
authority delegated to them in clear, written instructions as to the limits of their authority 
through their warrant (FAR, 2012).  The PCO is responsible for meeting the conditions of the 
contract, and, therefore, spends more time on business and legal issues and contract 
administration (Deneault & Stambaugh, 2000, p. 23).  A PCO’s warrant is taken very 
seriously; it distinguishes an individual for taking on a significant amount of responsibility 
and accountability. 
Warrants are not taken for granted after they are received because they can be 
lost through job changes or the belief by superiors that a person lacks the 
skills or knowledge necessary to uphold the position.  When a warrant is lost a 
contracting officer has no choice but to change careers or earn another 
warrant. (Deneault & Stambaugh, 2000, p. 22)   
The government’s warrant authorizes the PCO as the only individual who can financially 
obligate the organization and requires them to be involved in all communications (Deneault 
& Stambaugh, 2000, p. 22).  Thus, a significant amount of training is required on the 
constraints of the law and requirements of the contract (Deneault & Stambaugh, 2000, p. 22).  
No contract shall be entered into unless the PCO ensures that all requirements of law, 
executive orders, regulations, and other applicable procedures, including clearances and 
approvals, have been met (FAR, 2012).  Further, PCOs are responsible for ensuring 
performance of all necessary actions for effective contracting, to include ensuring 
compliance with the terms of the contract and safeguarding the interests of the United States 
in its contractual relationships while ensuring adherence to procurement laws and 
regulations, given their ability and instructed by title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(C.F.R.), the FAR (2012), and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS; 2010). Additionally, the PCO is responsible for assisting in clarifying agency 
needs, conducting market research, determining contract methods, planning acquisitions, 
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1986).  In order to perform these responsibilities, contracting officers should be allowed wide 
latitude to exercise business judgment.  The FAR specifically mandates that contracting 
officers shall 
(a) Ensure that the requirements of 1.602-1(b) (FAR 2012) have been met, and 
that sufficient funds are available for obligation; 
(b) Ensure that contractors receive impartial, fair, and equitable treatment; and 
(c) Request and consider the advice of specialists in audit, law, engineering, 
information security, transportation, and other fields, as appropriate. 
(d) Unless the contracting officer retains and executes the COR duties, in 
accordance with agency procedures, designate and authorize, in writing, a 
COR on all contracts and orders other than those that are firm-fixed price, and 
for firm-fixed-price contracts and orders as appropriate. (FAR, 2012) 
3. Project Manager and Principal Contracting Officer Similarities and 
Differences 
Often PMs and PCOs work in a matrix organization characterized by multifunctional 
teams.  PMs’ and PCOs’ roles often overlap in terms of competencies and responsibilities.  
This is evident in looking at their professional certification programs, bodies of knowledge, 
and day-to-day interactions (Garrett, 2010).  On the acquisition team, the PM is responsible 
for what needs to be done to execute the program through the phases outlined in the 
acquisition strategy; the PCO and the other members of the acquisition team implement the 
strategy through the contract (Krieger, 2011b, p. 42).  In successful programs PMs and PCOs 
work together effectively, yet there is a great deal of conflict.  In some instances, the PM is 
separated from the supported team members (Deneault & Stambaugh, 2000, p. 22).  PMs rely 
on their functional departmental support to achieve program success.  In this interaction, 
there is a potential for conflicts between the stakeholders’ interests; the PM is in charge 
overall, but the PCO is the only member that can challenge the PM’s authority (Deneault & 
Stambaugh, 2000, p. 22).  PMs often feel that their flexibility is constrained by the 
conservative interpretations of the PCO (Deneault & Stambaugh, 2000).  PM and PCO roles 
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Flexibility and adaptability have become prerequisite traits for PMs and PCOs to succeed 
(Deneault & Stambaugh, 2000, p. 22).   
As previously discussed, the PM is focused on meeting cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives while progressing through the project life cycle.  The PCO is 
responsible for ensuring all aspects of the law are complied with and protecting the 
government’s interests.  These two different perspectives are often in conflict with each 
other.  The PCO’s objectives do not align with the PM’s.  This could be the reason why one 
could say the PCO is the unpopular player on the acquisition team (Hirsch, 1986).   
4. Contracting Officer Representative 
PCOs designate and authorize the CORs.  As the technical subject matter expert on 
the acquisition team, the COR is an integral stakeholder in the contracting process and is the 
first line of surveillance on government contracts. The COR also plays a critical role in 
contract administration.  Agencies and departments have many different titles to describe the 
COR.  Other titles used for this role are government technical representative (GTR) and 
government technical evaluator (GTE; Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 1994).  In this 
thesis, we use COR because it is the most common title for this function.  The COR is 
nominated by the PCO, as early as practicable in the acquisition process (FAR, 2012). The 
COR’s administrative duties range from simple to complex, dependent on the type of 
contract, contractor performance, and the nature of the work.  The COR functions as the 
“eyes and ears” of the contracting officer and monitors technical performance, reporting any 
potential or actual problems to the contracting officer (Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 
1994).  A COR must stay in close communication with the contracting officer, relaying any 
information that may affect contractual commitments and requirements.  The FAR (2012) 
specifically mandates that a COR must meet the following criteria:  
 shall be a government employee, unless otherwise authorized in agency 
regulations;  
 shall be certified and maintain certification;  
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 may not re-delegate responsibility to perform functions that have been 
delegated;  
 has no authority to make any commitments or changes that affect price, 
quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of the contract; and 
 nominated by the requirements official. 
It should be noted that although the COR is a critical member of the acquisition team 
as defined by the FAR, the COR is not a member of the acquisition work force, as defined by 
the Defense Acquisition Work Force Improvement Act (DAWIA; 1990).   
The COR provides the technical expertise necessary for successful contracting and 
plays a critical role in affecting the outcome of the contract administration process, as well as 
ensuring maximum return on contract dollars.  The following is an example taken from the 
researchers’ own experience of COR duties for a consulting services contract: 
 Control all government technical interfaces with the contractor;  
 Ensure that a copy of all government technical correspondence is forwarded to 
the contracting officer for placement in the contract (delivery/task order) file;  
 Promptly furnish documentation on any requests for change, deviation, or 
waiver, whether generated by the government or the contracting officer (and 
ordering officer) for their action; 
 Determine causes when the contract is not progressing as expected and make 
recommendations to the contracting officer for corrective action;  
 Monitor contractor performance to ensure individual contractor employees are 
of the skill levels required and are actually performing at the levels charged 
against the contract during the performance period;  
 Monitor contractor performance to ensure that the labor hours charged against 
the contract are consistent and reasonable for the effort completed and that 
any travel charged was necessary and actually occurred;  
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 Ensure that property provided to the contractor is authorized by the contract; 
and  
 Complete the COR Report of Contractor’s Performance in accordance with 
the schedule established in the contract administration plan for a contract.  
The PM, PCO, and COR are critical stakeholders responsible for overall program 
success.  These stakeholders hold key decision-making positions and at times may overexert 
their influence based on their positions, resulting in difficult and contentious conflicts 
(Deneault & Stambaugh, 2000). 
As previously discussed, each stakeholder has conflicting goals and objectives,  as 
well as different guiding policies and directives.  These all could lead to deficiencies in DoD 
services contracting.  We will present these deficiencies in the next section.  
D. DEFICIENCIES IN SERVICE CONTRACTS 
The DoD’s contract obligations doubled between fiscal years 2001 and 2008 to over 
$387 billion with $200 billion expended on services (Government Accountability Office 
[GAO], 2009).  Commensurately, the acquisition workforce declined from 500,000 to 
200,000 personnel in 2006 (Gansler, 2011, p. 237). The downsizing of the defense 
acquisition workforce has reduced a qualified contracting and acquisition workforce 
necessary to manage the increased service contract workload (GAO, 2002b, 2009). Human 
capital problems are debilitating many agencies and threaten the ability of others to perform 
their missions efficiently and effectively (GAO, 2001). Both the GAO and the DoD Inspector 
General (IG) have indicated that failing to maintain an adequate workforce to manage 
billion-dollar acquisitions increases the risk of poor acquisition outcomes and the likelihood 
of fraud, waste, and abuse (GAO, 2009). From 2001 to 2009, the GAO issued 16 reports 
identifying deficiencies, trends, and challenges in contract management. In addition, the DoD 
IG issued 142 reports on deficiencies in the DoD acquisition and contract administration 
process. Deficiencies include selection of an inappropriate contract type allocating 
unnecessary risk to the government. DoD contracting officers have selected risk-laden cost 
contracts for services in which a fixed contract type could have been used, diverting the 
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DoD IG reports have expanded on the government’s lack of adequate market research 
relevant to determining the proper contracting strategy during the procurement planning of 
service contracts (GAO, 2002a; DoD IG, 2009).  
Requirements management is required to effectively define and meet the customers’ 
needs and expectations. Despite the importance of requirements management, the DoD IG 
and GAO have indicated poorly defined requirements and inadequate requirements 
management as a problem in service contracting (GAO, 2007c; DoD IG, 2009). Although the 
implementation of project management tools and processes, such as cross-functional teams, 
is considered a best practice in service contracts and would improve the coordination and 
management of service acquisitions, the GAO has indicated the DoD lacks management 
structure and processes for managing service contracts (GAO, 2002b, 2007c; DoD IG, 2009). 
The GAO has described the DoD’s current approach to service contract management as 
reactive and not fully addressing the key factors of success (GAO, 2007c). Oversight and 
surveillance are prudent to achieving contractors’ adequate performance of services and 
assist in precluding any contractor performance problems. Lack of oversight compromises 
the government’s ability to provide complete value to its constituents. Yet, DoD IG and GAO 
reports have consistently identified issues in service contract administration and oversight 
(GAO, 2005, 2007a, 2007c; DoD IG, 2009). According to the GAO, the poor management of 
service contracts has undermined the government’s ability to obtain a good value for the 
money spent and contributed to the GAO’s decision to designate contract management a 
high-risk area for the DoD (GAO, 2001, 2007b, 2011). 
The DoD IG’s and GAO’s finding on deficiencies in the service contract process can 
be further explained by utilizing stakeholder theory.   
E. STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
1. Definition and Implication for DoD Services Contracting  
Stakeholder theory can be used to analyze and discuss the similarities and differences 
that we anticipate will exist in defining and measuring the success of a service contract 
between the PM, PCO, and COR.  In this section, we describe the foundations of stakeholder 
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lead to a better understanding of both the conflicting and common interests the PM, PCO, 
and COR might have.  This can help acquisition professionals to better understand why 
various stakeholders in DoD service contracting define and measure the success of service 
contracts differently.    
There have been numerous definitions of what a stakeholder is, but no definition is 
more important than that of Edward Freeman (1984). Considered a pioneer in the field of 
stakeholder theory, Freeman defined a stakeholder as any group or individual person(s) that 
can be affected by an organization or identity achieving its mission or objectives (Freeman, 
1984).  Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar (2004) of the Darden School of Business, have stated 
that stakeholder theory illustrates clear conflicts of interest between the different stakeholders 
within a project.  They stated that these conflicts of interest can have negative effects (such 
as inefficiencies and waste) on numerous projects. Differing goals and objectives of the 
various stakeholders drive these negative impacts (Freeman et al., 2004). Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) further explain that organizations that actively manage the often-conflicting 
interests of internal stakeholders fare far better in traditional measures of success, such as 
return on investment and profits, than those who do not (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  What 
this means for DoD services contracting is quite apparent. With the differing goals, 
objectives, and responsibilities of the various stakeholders (PM, PCO, COR) within DoD 
services contracting, it is prudent to assume that conflicts will arise with regard to how a 
service contract is processed, as well as answering the questions of how a successful service 
contract is defined and measured. While profit and return on investment are not applicable to 
defense services contracting, it is important to note the impact that managing stakeholder 
interests will have on the public sector, specifically in the area of public interest, by 
increasing integrity, accountability, and transparency in the contracting process.  By 
managing the stakeholders’ conflicting interests, the DoD may achieve some of the 
additional efficiencies received by its counterparts in the private sector.    
2. Stakeholder Management 
Stakeholder management is described as the management of the individuals and 
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services contracting, the “project” is the acquisition of the service.  Cleland describes the 
principle justification for utilizing a stakeholder management perspective to be the need to 
recognize the ability of key stakeholders to influence projects (Cleland, 1986).  As presented 
earlier in this chapter, the PM, PCO, and COR all have different roles and responsibilities 
within DoD services contracting. As such, they routinely have conflicting interests and 
objectives on a service contract, which in turn may lead to conflicting definitions and 
measures of a successful service contract.  Stakeholder theory holds that the various 
stakeholders will routinely have not just differing objectives and motives for outcomes within 
a project, but additionally will have differing ideas as to which factors are the most important 
for determining the success of a project.  This can present additional future challenges when 
balancing the tradeoffs between different performance criteria (such as cost and schedule) of 
a contract (PMI, 2008). Understanding stakeholder theory and how these different 
stakeholders maintain conflicting interests that will impact the contract allows us to better 
prepare for mitigating the adverse results of such conflicting objectives.  This relates directly 
to our research into the definitions and metrics for a successful service contract, as held by its 
chief stakeholders: PMs, PCOs, and CORs.  Cleland states that positive stakeholder 
management can lead to cooperation within the project (or service contract) between the 
different stakeholders, resulting in enhanced project objective achievement. Lack of positive 
stakeholder management will result in a reduction in project objective achievement (Cleland, 
1986). Translated into DoD services contracting, this means that proper management and 
mitigation of conflicting stakeholder objectives will lead to more effective and efficient 
services contracts. Additionally, this may lead to a more standardized definition and measure 
of successful service contracts by DoD PMs, PCOs, and CORs.  Understanding this concept 
allows acquisition professionals to predict and even aid in controlling the conflicting goals of 
different stakeholders within DoD services contracting.   
One approach to standardized measures is S.M.A.R.T. metrics.   S.M.A.R.T. is a tool 
utilized by corporate officers, managers, and supervisors in helping to determine quantifiable 
metrics and objectives for their project and company mission.  The establishment of 
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organization’s management process (Doran, 1981).  Each metric should have the following 
attributes: 
 Specific: It targets a specific area for improvement 
 Measurable: It quantifies or provides an indicator of progress. 
 Assignable: Someone is determined to have responsibility for it. 
 Realistic: It can realistically be obtained, given resource constraints. 
 Time related: It is specific to when the results can be achieved. (Doran, 1981) 
F.  SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we introduced past and current literature on the service contracting 
process, the acquisition team, roles and responsibilities of service acquisition personnel, 
goals and objectives of service acquisition personnel, deficiencies in service contracts, and 
stakeholder theory. 
The next chapter describes our research methodology, including the type of analysis, 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of how we collected and analyzed our data in 
order to achieve our objectives and answer the research questions discussed in Chapter I.  We 
discuss the formulation of the interview questions, the survey, and our analytical process.  In 
this chapter, we also include a description of the qualitative methods we used in analyzing 
the data collected from the Navy contracting activities.  Our purpose was to conduct an 
exploratory research analysis of the definition and measurement of successful services 
contracts.  The objective of the research was to build upon the understanding developed in 
prior research and to explain what metrics are utilized to help identify the factors that 
influence the efficiency and effectiveness of service contracts.  We analyzed the collected 
data qualitatively in order to draw conclusions about the definition and measurement of 
success of service contracts, as well as the commonalities and distinctions among the 
stakeholders.   
B. DATA COLLECTION 
We conducted interviews and surveys with the PMs, PCOs, and CORs located at and 
associated with the following contracting commands: Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA), Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and Naval Fleet Logistics Center 
(FLC) Philadelphia.  Table 1 identifies the number of stakeholders interviewed and surveyed. 








CONTRACTOR 2 N/A 2 
PRINCIPAL CONTRACTING OFFICER/ 
CONTRACT SPECIALISTS 22 N/A 22 
CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVE 13 1 14 
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1. Participating Commands 
NAVSEA’s overarching mission is to engineer, build, buy, and maintain ships, 
submarines, and combat systems to meet the United States Navy’s current and future 
operational needs.  NAVSEA’s fiscal budget is 25% of the Navy’s entire budget, at nearly 
$30 billion.  NAVSEA manages over 150 acquisition programs, to include foreign and 
domestic military sales.  NAVSEA is an essential system command for the United States 
Navy, providing efficient resources and support for the nation (NAVSEA, 2012.).  
NAVAIR’s mission is to provide full life cycle support of naval aviation aircraft, 
weapons, and systems for the United States Navy: to provide the right capability, at the right 
time, at the right cost.  This support includes research, design, development, systems 
engineering, acquisition, test and evaluation, training, repair, and logistics support. NAVAIR 
also provides support to its program executive officers with its assigned duties of meeting 
cost, schedule, and performance requirements within its respective programs (NAVAIR, 
2012).  
FLC Philadelphia is a subordinate command of Naval Supply Systems Command. 
FLC Philadelphia’s mission is to deliver sustained global logistics resources to the United 
States Navy and the joint warfighter. FLC Philadelphia manages supply chains that provide 
material for Navy aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and their weapon systems.  
Additionally, they provide logistics support services, material management and warehousing 
services, contracting and acquisition, as well as all food service operational support ashore 
and afloat (Naval Supply Systems Command, 2012). 
2. Interview Questions  
We developed interview questions and a survey to answer the following core research  
questions: 
 What is the definition of a successful service contract? 
 How is the success of a service contract being measured?  
We used the following five survey and interview questions: 
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2. What is your current functional role? 
3. What is your DAWIA level certification? 
4. How do you define a successful service contract and what factors are included 
in your definition? 
5. How do you measure the success of a service contract and what metrics are 
included in your measurements? 
The first two questions of the survey and interviews identify the demographics of the 
respondents to establish broad categories. The third question, on DAWIA level certification, 
gives insight into the respondents’ level of training, experience, and education.  The DAWIA 
establishes a procedure through which acquisition workforce personnel are recognized as 
having achieved qualification in their core discipline. Certification is the procedure through 
which a DoD component determines that an employee has met the necessary education, 
training, and experience standards.  These standards are required for a career in government 
acquisition, technology, and logistics fields.  DAWIA level certifications are categorized as 
Level I, Level II, and Level III.  The remaining two questions address the primary purpose of 
our research, to determine how stakeholders define and measure the success of service 
contracts.    
C. ANALYTICAL PROCESS 
We chose open-ended questions to gain qualitative data for our research and to 
accommodate differentiated responses from varied stakeholders.  In Chapter IV, we present 
this qualitative data in graphical and tabular formats.  By consolidating the data into 
categories, we were able to conduct further analysis.  We identify commonalities and 
relationships in the data to determine the answers to our research questions, identified in 
Chapter I.   Additionally, we determine if the stakeholders (PM, PCO, and COR) are in fact 
utilizing effective and quantifiable S.M.A.R.T. metrics.  
D. SUMMARY 
In Chapter III, we identified which Navy organizations we surveyed and interviewed, 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 26 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 27 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
IV. INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT, RESULTS, AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we examine the interview responses.  The objective of this research 
was to define and measure the success of service contracts by collecting interview and survey 
data.  We utilized a standard script of five questions presented to each stakeholder.  The 
interviews were conducted at the following contracting activities: NAVSEA, NAVAIR, and 
FLC Philadelphia.  Additionally, interviews were conducted with CORs associated with 
these contracting activities.    
B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The interview consisted of three demographic questions and two core research 
questions: 
1. What is your branch of service or service affiliation? 
2. What is your current functional role? 
3. What is your DAWIA level certification? 
4. How do you define a successful service contract and what factors are included 
in your definition? 
5. How do you measure the success of a service contract and what metrics are 
included in your measurements? 
The purpose of the demographic questions was twofold: to establish the individual’s 
level of knowledge, experience, and education (DAIWA level certification) and to identify 
the individual’s role (PM, PCO, or COR) and branch of service (Navy, Marine Corps, Air 
Force, or Army). 
The purpose of the core research questions was to identify the key definitions and 
factors determining the definition of a successful service contract and to discover the metrics 
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C. PROJECT MANAGER FINDINGS 
In the course of our research, we were only able to survey and interview three PMs.  
We found that service contracts generally do not have a designated PM and that the role is 
typically filled by the incumbent COR.  The definitions and measurements of success given 
by the proxy PMs aligned with the responsibilities of a traditional PM and focused on cost, 
schedule, and performance.  We found that the PMs considered the following measures as 
key to defining the success of a service contract: clarity in the statement of work, 
effectiveness, unproblematic, schedule, and tracking costs. Further, the PMs stated that end 
user evaluations, customer satisfaction, and performance (meeting the requirements in the 
statement of work) were essential in measuring the success of a service contract.   
D. DATA ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPAL CONTRACTING OFFICERS 
1. Overview of Data Collected From Principal Contracting Officer 
Of the 22 interviews conducted, 16 were with PCOs and six were with contract 
specialists.  The DAWIA level certification of the PCO and contract specialists ranged 
widely: 15 had a Level III certification, four had a Level II certification, and three had a 
Level I certification.  Based on the interviews of the PCOs and contract specialists, the 
responses for defining the success of service contracts were classified into nine categories, 
presented in Table 2. 






 Executing contract on time  
 Doing it in a timely manner 
 Meeting milestones 
 Getting contracts awarded on time 
 Keeping to the schedule 
Unproblematic 
(Process) 
 “Don’t have to do a lot of administrative modifications and 
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 “Successful bid process where there is not any animosity 
between the parties”  
 Relatively unproblematic 
 Runs smoothly 
 Operates seamlessly  




 Meeting customer requirements 
 Business-like concern for the customer 
 Motivated contractor performance 
 Got what we paid for 
 Satisfies the mission requirements 
 Delivers the service that your customer expected 
 “Responsive to the needs of the contract and the needs of 
the activity” 




 Clearly defined statement of work 
 Well-defined requirement  
 “Satisfies the test requirements identified in the 
Performance Work Statement” 
 “How are the services defined and is it defined in a way that 
it is clear to industry.” 
 “Understanding needs of the customers” 
Communication 
(Process) 
 Customer involvement 
 Partnership with industry 
 “Contractor has to be motivated to perform.” 
 “Contracting group as well as the programs side all know 
what needs to get done.” 
 “Able to work with all parties involved.”  
 “A lot of integration up front with the customer and our 
office” 
 “Mutual understanding as to what is required, the manner in 
which it will be furnished and then how we will monitor 
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 “Choosing the right contract” 
 “Flexibility in your contract vehicle” 
Efficient  
(Process) 
 “There would be some sort of result in efficiency that came 




  “Maintain rules and regulations.” 
  Maintain Costs 
(Outcome) 
 “Services at the right price” 
 “Spending dollars wisely” 
 “Keep within cost” 
 No overruns 
 “Contractor’s costs well controlled” 
 “Perform the work within the budget” 
 “Not running into issues where the contractor’s been 
performing but hasn’t had funding” 
 
Of the 22 contracting officers and specialists interviewed, 68% of respondents 
specified customer satisfaction and maintaining costs as definitions of success. Fifty-five 
percent of respondents indicated unproblematic as a key catgory in the success of a service 
contract.  At 45%, the third most prominent definition of success was well-defined 
requirements.  Thirty-six percent of the respondents indicated communication as relevant to 
the success of a service contract. Twenty-three percent of the contracting officers indicated 
that maintaining the schedule is relevant to the success of a service contract.  The final three 
criteria—adherence to regulations, contract vehicle, efficiency—were specified by 5%, 9%, 
and 9% of the respondents, respectively. PCOs’ response rates for each definition of success 
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Figure 4.   PCO Success Definitions 
2. Overview of Data Collected on Contracting Officers 
Based on the interviews with the contracting officers and specialists, the responses for 
measuring the success of service contracts were classified into five general categories, 
depicted in Table 3. 






 Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System 
(CPARS) 
 Past Performance Information Retrieval System 
(PPIRS)  
 COR annual report, mini CPARS, COR functional 
reviews 
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 COR review, customer reviews 
 Prior contract performance 
 Subjective 
 Past history, or requests from customer to write a 
contactor a letter or amend the contract 
 Feedback from customers on contractor performance 
 Evaluation and recording 
 Ability to get future contracts 
 A way to track contractors 
Surveillance Plan 
(Process) 
 Is the contractor performing in accordance with the 
Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) 
 Built-in measurements that measure quality 
 Deficiency reports 
 Measurements of successful performance 
 Realistic expectations 
 “Performance evaluation factors to gather from the 
contract” 
 “Frequency of when the service is performed” 
 “Something to easily put your eyes on” 
 “Performance standard metrics” 
 Quality control 
 “Requirement summary of the various tasks” 
 “How well the contractor is performing” 
 Monitoring turnaround times 
Track Costs 
(Outcome) 
 “Burning through ceiling faster than anticipated” 
 “Tracking: spend rates, proposed man hours compared 
to what is being delivered” 
 “Measuring performance to cost controls” 
 Measuring workload status 
 Maintaining good cost control 
 “Being involved with my COR early to say, are you 
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 “Performance is measured via cost control tracking 
hours, dollars, and parameters to hours and dollars, not 
over or under running.” 
 “Making sure that the costs in the end are at the 
proposed level and within budget, tracking different 
modifications to obligations, milestones on how long 
things are taking.” 
Customer Satisfaction 
(Outcome) 
 Customer feedback 
 “Customer service surveys given to the activity for the 
contracting office, immediate feedback on vendor 
issues, am I (the agency) comfortable (uncomfortable) 
with the guy (the contractor)”  
 “Am I (the agency) not comfortable with the guy (the 
contractor)”   
 “A lot of times that’s (customer satisfaction) built 
around personal interaction with the contractor more so 
than actual good or bad performance.”  
 “Level of angst, complaints from discontent customers” 
Track Schedule 
(Outcome) 
 Meeting milestones 
 Awarded on time 
 Not a break in service 
 “Execution of procurement planning agreement” 
 “Internal work in progress (WIP) reports to track the 
number of days the contract has been in house or 
workload assigned in the system with no errors, timely 
delivery, all deliverables received, on schedule, are the 
deliverables on time.”  
Of the 22 PCOs and contract specialists interviewed, 59% of the respondents listed 
past performance as a measurement for service contract success.  Having a surveillance plan 
was also indicated as a measurement for service contract success by 59% of respondents.   
Forty-one percent of the respondents identified customer satisfaction, 27% identified tracking 
costs, and 23% identified tracking schedule.  PCO response rates for each measure of success 
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Figure 5.   PCO Measures of Success 
3. Research Findings From PCO Interviews 
Findings for the PCOs produced no decisive definition of success; no category 
received an absolute majority of responses. Several categories did receive a strong rating, 
with over half of the respondents identifying these categories as indicators of a successful 
service contract. The most frequent definitions of a successful service contract were 
satisfying the customer and maintaining costs, both of which had 15 responses. Of nearly 
equal significance was the category unproblematic with 12 responses. Well-defined 
requirements was indicated as a definition of success by 10 respondents. The Department of 
Defense COR Handbook specifies a properly written statement of objectives (SOO) or 
statement of work (SOW) as increasing the likelihood of success (Director, Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 2012). Eight PCOs identified communication expressed 
between primarily the contractor, customer, and PCO as an indicator of success. 
Communication is a trait necessary within a business organization; it allows the acquisition 
team to work together to successfully purchase a service (Garrett, 2010).   In comparison 
with the FAR’s performance requirements of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered 
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indicated maintaining costs as definitions of success. Categories deemed to be defining 
factors of success to a lesser extent were contract vehicle, efficiency, and adherence to 
regulation with the following response rates: two, two, and one, respectively. 
Similar to contract success definitions, the findings yielded no definitive 
measurement of success.  Each response was grouped into five categories. With 13 responses 
each, the two most frequent responses were past performance and surveillance plan.  
Customer satisfaction yielded nine responses; tracking costs received six, and tracking 
schedule five.  PCOs’ responses revealed the measurements of service contract success are in 
a majority of cases very subjective and ambiguous.  As summed up by several respondents: 
“At the end of the day, we don’t have a numeric score of yes, this contractor gets a B+” and 
“[we have] CPARS ratings—but a lot of them are pretty subjective.”  An analysis of Figure 5 
reveals, with respect to outcome-based measurements, past performance as documented 
through the COR annual reports in CPARS is the most common approach to measuring 
contract success.     
4. Outcome Versus Process 
Our findings on PCO definitions and metrics of a successful service contract 
demonstrate both an outcome- and process-oriented approach.  The PCOs’ definitions of a 
successful service contract aligned to a hybrid approach, with three of the nine categories of 
responses being outcome oriented, and five of the nine categories being process oriented.  
The two most common response categories were customer satisfaction and maintained costs: 
both are outcome-based definitions. The findings illustrate that the definition of a successful 
service contract incorporates both outcome- and process-driven criteria. While the two 
prominent definitions of success were outcome based, the majority of the definitions were 
process based. The majority of process-based definitions could be a result of the PCOs’ 
greater involvement in the pre-award versus the post-award phase of the service contract 
process. The contracting offer is able to determine, through his pre-award actions, the 
subsequent results with respect to a successful service contract.  
The results on PCO measurements of success show that four out of five response 
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two significant categories, past performance and surveillance plan, were process and 
outcome based, respectively.  This mix of process and outcome are linked.  The surveillance 
plan, a process approach, facilitates the measurement of past performance, an outcome 
approach, in the form of CPARS.  
Of the five measurements, we found past performance, track costs, and track schedule 
met all the criteria of the S.M.A.R.T. tool. As previously discussed, the S.M.A.R.T. tool is 
utilized to assist corporate managers and supervisors to determine quantifiable metrics and 
objectives.  Although surveillance plan accounted for 59% of the responses, it failed to 
properly address the criteria of realistic in S.M.A.R.T.  Therefore the most quantifiable and 
appropriate measures for success of a service contract should be past performance, track 
costs, and track schedule.  Table 4 shows how PCO responses align with the S.M.A.R.T. 
categories. 
Table 4.   S.M.A.R.T. PCO Metrics 
CATEGORY S M A R T 
Past Performance √ √ √ √ √ 
Surveillance Plan √ √ √  √ 
Track Costs √ √ √ √ √ 
Customer Satisfaction   √   
Track Schedule √ √ √ √ √ 
 
E. DATA ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVES 
1. Overview of Data Collected From Contractive Officer Representatives 
Fourteen CORs were interviewed for this research.  DAWIA level certification had 
been obtained by 35% of the CORs we interviewed.  This represented a smaller portion than 
we originally anticipated.  However, DAWIA certification is not a requirement for 
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Based on the COR interviews, we arranged the responses for defining the success of 
service contracts into four categories (identified as a process or outcome) with common 
descriptions of each category as depicted in Table 5. 






 Timeliness, (on) schedule 




 Responsive to statement of work (SOW) 
 Statement of objectives (SOO) 
 Satisfactory deliverables 
 Performance satisfactory with terms and conditions of contract 
 Maintained performance within conditions of contract 







 No deviation in work performed 
 Clarity in SOW/SOO 
 Requirements met needs of the end user 
 Clearly written contract 
 Well-defined criteria that are documented 
 Clarity of SOW allows for proper estimating in terms of 
preparing government cost estimation 




 Continuous feedback by and between COR/contractor/end user 
 Clear language and communication between 
contractor/customer 
 Open communication 
Maintain Costs 
(Outcome) 
 Adherence to budget, no cost overruns 
 No project creep 
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 Cost in line with services required 
 Fair cost to government 
 Meets price guidelines 
 Deliverables on time and within budget 
Of the 14 CORs interviewed, 71% responded that well-defined scope and 
requirements were key factors in defining a successful service contract, while 58% of CORs 
responded that schedule was a key factor in defining the success of a service contract.  
Performance had the third highest response rate at 50%.  The categories of communication 
and maintaining cost represented 21% of the responses.  Response rates for these definitions 
of success are depicted in Figure 6.   
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2. Overview of Data Collected on Contracting Officer Representatives 
Based on the COR interviews, we categorized the responses for measuring the 
success of service contracts into seven categories (identified as a process or outcome) with 
common descriptions of each category, depicted in Table 6. 






 Contract performed in accordance with terms and 
conditions of the contract 
 Deliverables met quality requirements in SOW 
 Proven response times on service contracts 
End User Evaluation 
(Outcome) 
 Final product/service met needs as of end user as 
evaluated by end user 
 Summary reviews by technical experts 
Track Schedule 
(Outcome) 
 On time 
 Timeliness 
 All deliverables received 
Communication 
(Process) 
 Feedback loop maintained between contractor  
COR, PM, and/or end user 
 Required reporting delivered/received 
O d b i i b d
No Rework 
(Outcome) 
 No loss of time on rework 









 Final costs remained within projected costs 
 No cost overruns 
 Billable hours matched contractual levels 




 No contractor protests 
 Unproblematic source selection and award process 
Of the 14 CORs interviewed, 71% responded that performance was the key factor in 
defining the success of a service contract. Twenty-eight percent of respondents selected track 
schedule; 21% chose  end user evaluation; and 14% chose  adherence to budget.  Seven 
percent of respondents selected each of the following criteria: good communication, no 
protest, and no rework.  COR response rates for these measures of success are depicted in 
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Figure 7.   COR Measures of Success  
3. Research Findings From COR Interviews 
The research findings from our interviews conducted with CORs clearly 
demonstrated varying definitions for a successful service contract, as well as numerous ways 
in which to measure this success or lack thereof. Of the 14 CORs interviewed, the highest 
response category was performance, which received 10 responses, followed by the category 
of track schedule, with four responses.  The remaining five categories of responses yielded as 
high as three responses or as few as one.  Some of the variability found in the measurement 
of service contracts can be explained by the numerous types of services being contracted.  
These CORs represented contracts that range from medical supplies to legal counsel.  The 
heavily diverse nature of these service contracts may have contributed to the lack of a 
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The definitions of successful service contracts were less variable than the responses 
received for measuring the success of service contracts.  Of the 14 CORs interviewed, 10 
responded that well-defined scope/requirements was the most important criteria for defining 
a successful service contract, while the categories of schedule and performance had eight and 
seven responses, respectively.  Communication and maintaining costs each had three 
responses. This outcome clearly shows that within the COR stakeholder group, there exists a 
more standardized definition of what is a successful service contract. 
4. Outcome Versus Process  
Our findings on COR definitions and metrics of a successful service contract 
demonstrate outcome-, process-, or hybrid-oriented approaches.  The CORs’ definition of a 
successful service contract aligned more to a hybrid-oriented approach, with three of the five 
categories of responses being outcome oriented and two of the five categories being process 
oriented.  The two most common response categories were well-defined scope/requirements 
(process oriented) and schedule (outcome oriented).  The significance of this finding is that it 
clarifies that, for CORs, both outcome- and process-driven criteria are important in 
determining the key factors defining a successful service contract.   
The CORs’ metrics for a successful service contract were overwhelmingly outcome 
driven, with six of the seven response categories being outcome oriented.  Additionally, the 
two most prevalent responses were performance (outcome) and track schedule (outcome).  
These findings clearly demonstrate the importance that outcome-specific measurements have 
in the success of a service contract as determined by CORs.   
When analyzing the findings on metrics for a successful service contract, we focused 
on whether each category was responsive to the demands found in the S.M.A.R.T. objectives 
protocol, as presented in Chapter II 
Of the seven measurements, we found performance, track schedule, and track costs 
met all the criteria of the S.M.A.R.T. tool. As previously discussed, the S.M.A.R.T. tool is 
utilized to assist corporate managers and supervisors to determine quantifiable metrics and 
objectives.  Although end user evaluation accounted for 21% of the responses, it only met the 
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measures for success of a service contract should be performance, track schedule, and track 
costs, as shown in Table 7.  
Table 7.   Success Measurement Categories and S.M.A.R.T. 
CATEGORY S M A R T 
Performance √  √ √ √ 
End User Evaluation   √   
Track Schedule √ √ √ √ √ 
Communication   √   
No Rework √  √   
Track Costs √ √ √ √ √ 
No Protest √ √ √   
 
We discovered that the majority of the categories for COR measurements of a 
successful service contract failed to properly address the objectives of S.M.A.R.T.  This 
clearly demonstrates that, currently, a substantial portion of CORs are not properly 
measuring the success of service contracts.  
F. CONTRACTOR FINDINGS 
Despite the emphasis of this research on the PCO and COR, we were able to 
interview two contractors and gain their perspective on the definition and measurements of 
success in a service contract.  The contractors’ definitions of success include winning repeat 
business, finding ways to innovate, satisfying the customer, helping the customer shape the 
SOW, and helping the government “folks get up to speed.”   
The contractors’ measurements of success are profit and the ability to perform and 
execute the specific task.  Based on this response, this measurement was aligned with FAR 
46.105: “The contractor is responsible for carrying out its obligations under the contract” 
(FAR, 2012).  Success is also measured in terms of spend rates—that is, over or under budget 
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task).  The definitions and measurements of success allude to maximizing profit as the 
overarching goal of a contractor.     
G. CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVE AND PRINCIPAL 
CONTRACTING OFFICER COMPARISON  
1. Contracting Officer Representative and Principal Contracting Officer 
Similarities in Definitions of Success 
Our research revealed the following similarities between CORs and PCOs when 
defining the success of a service contract: 
 schedule, 
 maintaining costs, 
 communication, and 
 well-defined scope and requirements. 
a. Schedule 
The data show that both the PCO and COR identify maintaining schedule as a 
common definition of success.  PCOs and CORs are both members of the acquisition team 
guided by the objectives and regulations of the FAR.  In service contracts, the COR often 
performs the functions of a PM; thus, schedule is an important factor to the COR as well as 
progressing the contract through the acquisition life cycle.  Additionally, the FAR states the 
acquisition team must satisfy the customer in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the 
delivered goods or services (FAR, 2012).  Furthermore, the COR handbook states that the 
COR should ensure that the contract for goods or services is timely and highlights schedule 
as a key assessment factor (Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 2012). 
The schedule is the most visible and scrutinized performance measure for both the PCO and 
the COR.  For example, the workload of the PCO is driven by their WIP report, which tracks 
the number of days the contract has been assigned in the system.  One of the key assessment 
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b. Maintain Costs 
Sixty-eight percent of PCOs and 21% of CORs identified maintaining costs as 
a definition of success.  Given the budget constraints, DoD acquisitions are limited by scarce 
resources.  As such, maintaining costs is a high priority.  Failure to maintain budget could 
result in a possible violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, defined as an obligation in excess of 
available funds. As mentioned earlier, the COR often assumes the responsibilities of the PM 
on service contracts; therefore, cost becomes a responsibility.  The data show a difference of 
47% between PCO and COR responses.  The disparity is a result of the PCOs’ accountability 
for contract administration; therefore, the PCO places a higher emphasis on maintaining 
costs.  This is supported by the FAR (2012), which states that PCOs “shall ensure that the 
requirements of 1.602-1(b) have been met and that sufficient funds are available for 
obligation.” 
c. Communication 
The data indicate that CORs and PCOs share communication as an attribute 
definitive to success.  Supporting this perspective, the FAR states the federal acquisition 
system will foster cooperative relationships between the government and its contractors. 
More important in each case, successful communication and continuous feedback between 
the PCO, COR, and acquisition team members contribute to service contract success.  When 
all members of the project team communicate properly, clear and concise objectives are 
conveyed to the team and the goal is understood and identified.  Additionally, clear 
communication is fundamental to overcoming deficiencies in service contracts. 
d. Well-Defined Scope and Requirements 
The data show that 71% of the CORs versus 45% of the PCOs define success 
as well-defined scope and requirements.  The COR and the PCO are focused on meeting the 
activity’s need and satisfying all technical aspects of the SOW.  A well-defined scope and set 
of requirements lay the foundation for the required services.  Therefore, the PCO and the 
COR have a vested interest in having a well-defined scope and in meeting requirements in 
the SOW.  With a proper SOW, contract performance is more likely to be successful.  One of 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 46 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
The requirements package is critical to the success of an acquisition because it commits the 
funds and establishes the basis for a contractual action. 
2. Contracting Officer Representative and Principal Contracting Officer 
Differences in Definitions of Success 
Our research revealed the following differences between CORs and PCOs when 
defining the success of a service contract: 
 unproblematic,  
 customer satisfaction, 
 adherence to rules and regulations, 
 contract vehicle, and 
 efficiency. 
a. Unproblematic 
Fifty-five percent of the PCOs stated unproblematic as a definition of success.  
The PCO is responsible for administrating all aspects of the contract; therefore, a problem-
free contract reduces the workload associated with additional modifications and contract-
related issues.  Increases in workload are even more substantial given the inadequate size of 
the acquisition workforce.  On the other hand, CORs are less concerned with contract 
administration and are more focused on technical evaluation factors.  The COR is more 
concerned with the surveillance plan and delivering problems to the contractor.  Problems are 
not a true concern to the COR.  According to the COR handbook, the COR is responsible for 
bringing any issues or performance problems to the attention of the PCO.     
b. Customer Satisfaction 
Sixty-eight percent of the PCOs identified customer satisfaction as a definition 
of success, demonstrating the emphasis PCOs place on customer satisfaction. The PCO is 
more customer service oriented than the COR, whose primary purpose is to monitor the 
performance of the contract. A PCO must evaluate all relevant surrounding circumstances to 
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a central role in determining contractors’ past performance, an evaluation factor required by 
the FAR that results in contract renewal or follow-on contracts.  
c. Adherence to Rules and Regulations 
Five percent of the PCOs stated adherence to rules and regulations was a 
definition of success.  In accordance with the FAR, the PCO ensures all requirements of law, 
executive orders, regulations, and other applicable procedures, including clearances and 
approvals, are adhered to in government contracting. The COR, while a representative of the 
PCO, has no true authority to affect change, such as altering the terms and conditions of the 
contract; therefore, the COR places no emphasis on compliance to rules and regulations. The 
COR’s only liability is in the form of unauthorized acts.  Adherence to rules and regulations 
is a core function and inherent to the position of PCO; therefore, adherence to rules and 
regulations is implied.   
d. Contract Vehicle 
Nine percent of the PCOs specified the contract vehicle as definitive of 
success. The CORs did not indicate contract vehicle as a definition of success. This is owing 
to the possible lack of integration of the COR in the pre-award phase of the service contract 
process. The Department of Defense COR Handbook (Director, Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy, 2012) only lists pre-award activities the COR may be involved with and 
makes no reference to required involvement.   
e. Efficiency  
Nine percent of PCOs interviewed specified efficiency as a definition of 
success.  The CORs made no acknowledgment of efficiency as a definition of service 
contract success. As previously determined, the CORs’ definition of success is primarily 
outcome oriented. The COR is concerned with tracking the contract’s compliance according 
to its terms and conditions, and with delivery of the final product. In contrast, the PCO’s 
definition of success is primarily process driven, and processes lend themselves to continuing 
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allowing the government to switch contract vehicles from a risk-burdened cost contract to a 
fixed contract, which transfers risk to the contractor. 
3. Contracting Officer Representative and Principal Contracting Officer 
Similarities in Measurements of Success 
Our research revealed the following similarities between CORs and PCOs when 
measuring the success of a service contract: 
 past performance and performance, 
 track costs, 
 track schedule, and 
 customer satisfaction and end user evaluation. 
a. Past Performance and Performance 
Our data show that 59% of PCOs measure past performance and 71% of 
CORs measure performance as indicators of success.   PCOs’ and CORs’ measures of 
performance are both outcome-based measurements.  Both measures employ user feedback 
as a gauge of success. The COR measures performance according to the surveillance plan, 
which provides input to the PCO’s measurement of past performance.  Based on the research, 
performance and past performance are two of the most relevant tools used for measuring 
success.  
b. Track Costs 
Our data revealed that 27% of PCOs measure tracking costs and 14% of 
CORs measure adherence to budget as success metrics.  This relates directly to the 
responsibilities of both the PCO and the COR. As outlined in the COR handbook, the COR 
must conduct surveillance to maintain costs (Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy, 2012). The FAR specifically mandates that PCOs ensure adherence to procurement 
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c. Track Schedule 
We found that CORs and PCOs placed similar emphasis on tracking the 
schedule,  with response rates of 28% and 23%, respectively.   We found that the response 
rates for tracking the schedule were relatively low given the the requirements of both the 
COR and PCO, in accordance with the COR handbook, to ensure that contract performance 
is timely and within the scope of work (Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy, 2012).  Additionally, the FAR states that the COR and PCO must satisfy the customer 
in terms of timeliness of the delivered service (FAR, 2012).   
d. Customer Satisfaction and COR End User Evaluation  
Our data revealed that PCOs placed a higher importance on customer 
satisfaction than the CORs; the two groups had response rates of 41% and 21%, respectively.  
This demonstrates that the PCO places more of an emphasis on customer satisfaction as a 
measure of success than the COR.   The low response rate from CORs was surprising given 
the close interaction of CORs with end users and technical evaluators within services 
contracts.  However, CORs are typically nominated for their technical expertise and not their 
customer relationship skills.  Conversely, PCOs’ positions are customer service oriented.  
Additionally, in certain cases, the COR is also the customer.     
4. Contracting Officer Representative and Principal Contracting Officer 
Differences in Measurements of Success 
Our research revealed the following differences between CORs and PCOs when 
measuring the success of a service contract: 
 no rework, no protest, and good communication; and 
 PCO surveillance plan 
a. No Rework, No Protest, and Good Communication 
CORs listed no rework, no protests, and good communication as measures of 
a successful service contract. However, the response rate for all three categories was only 7% 
each, equating to only one responder in each category.  As such, these categories represent a 
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b. PCO Surveillance Plan 
The PCO’s surveillance plan represented one of the highest response rates at 
59% (13 out of 22 respondents). The FAR states that government contract quality assurance 
shall be performed at such times and places as may be necessary to determine that the 
services conform to contract requirements (FAR, 2012).  The COR handbook clearly states 
that the QASP is an important tool for assessing the service contract for the COR (Director, 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 2012).  However, the CORs exhibited zero 
responses for surveillance plan, demonstrating a possible lack of training or that CORs’ 
experience involved contracts below the simplified threshold.  Further, the QASP may have 
been prepared by the contractor.  According to the FAR, “the Government may either prepare 
the quality assurance surveillance plan or require the offerors to submit a proposed quality 
assurance surveillance plan for the Government’s consideration in development of the 
Government’s plan” (FAR, 2012). 
H. CONCLUSIONS  
Our findings corroborate the deficiency found within the GAO report on best 
practices in acquisition services, which suggested there are few services contracting-related 
annual performance metrics (GAO, 2002a).  
Further, we found that there is no standardized definition or measurement for success 
of service contracts. While similarities do exist between the definitions and measures of 
success of a service contract, the level of emphasis placed on those similar categories was 
often disproportionate.   
In addition, those metrics in place were found to be lacking, both in terms of their 
ability to be quantified and their ability to meet the requirements of S.M.A.R.T. 
measurements.   
We discovered that the differing objectives and duties of the stakeholders clearly 
affected the factors that each stakeholder emphasized when defining and measuring the 
success of service contracts.  Stakeholder theory identifies the conflicts that arise between 
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In our research, we identified a clear lack of PMs within DoD services contracting.  
In many cases, the incumbent COR was the PM.  This supports GAO findings that the DoD 
lacks the proper management structure and processes for managing services contracts (GAO, 
2002b, 2007b; DoD IG, 2009)  
Finally, we discovered that no uniform certification process was established and 
required for CORs within services contracting at the time of our research.  This validates the 
GAO report’s conclusions on defense acquisition workforce training, stating that a lack of 
training for defense acquisition workforce personnel continues to plague DoD services 
contracting efforts (GAO, 2002). To our knowledge, reform measures are in process for the 
COR training certification process.     
We discovered that the COR is not as involved in the pre-award phase of service 
contracts.  According to the COR handbook, the COR is responsible for preparing the 
SOW/PWS and surveillance plan.  Our COR data indicate no reference to surveillance as a 
measure of success.  Typically, the person who develops the SOW/PWS also develops the 
surveillance methods.  The CORs’ lack of reference to a surveillance plan implies no 
significant involvement in developing the SOW/PWS. 
We found that the majority of PCOs put a large emphasis on past performance and 
surveillance plans, yet the QASP is only mandatory for use in acquisitions in excess of the 
simplified acquisition threshold.  Additionally, CPARS is only mandated for services 
acquisitions in excess of $1 million.  Yet, over 83% of United States federal acquisitions 
have an average dollar value of $25,000. Therefore, the majority of acquisitions are not 
required to possess any surveillance plan, nor are they required to have any evaluation on 
past performance. Only 1% of federal acquisition contracts are over $1 million (Garrett, 
2011).  
I. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A standardized definition of a successful service contract must be implemented, 
incorporating the proper factors with the correct level of emphasis.  Additionally, 
standardized and quantifiable measures must be implemented within DoD services 
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objective orientation.  This standard should incorporate only those definitions and measures 
that both support the objectives and goals of the DoD, as outlined in Chapters I and II, and 
are validated by correlations in stakeholder responses.  Furthermore, the standard metrics 
incorporated should meet the criteria outlined by S.M.A.R.T.  We suggest utilizing a 
balanced outcome- and process-oriented approach, incorporating the following categories 
when defining a successful service contract:  
 schedule,  
 cost maintenance,  
 communication,  
 and well-defined requirements. 
The standard measure for a successful service contract should incorporate solely an 
outcome-driven approach utilizing the following three metrics:  
 performance,  
 cost tracking, and  
 schedule tracking. 
These standard metrics are aligned with the FAR’s determination that the customer 
should be satisfied in terms of cost, timeliness, and quality of the delivered product or 
service.  Additionally, in accordance with the COR handbook, the COR and PCO must 
ensure that contract performance is timely and within the scope of work (Director, Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 2012).  Our recommended standards of defining and 
measuring the success of a service contract ensure adherence to these guidelines. These 
standards definitions and metrics for a successful service contract align with the goals and 
initiatives outlined by the USD (AT&L) to properly manage and assess each service contract 
to determine its performance.  Incorporation of these standards will allow for a more uniform 
analysis of this performance and could lead directly to the goals and objectives of the USD 
(AT&L) to promote efficient and effective services contracting, while reducing waste and 
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better analysis of the performance of a service contractor, leading to a selection of more 
efficient and effective contractors in future programs.  
In addition, these standards for defining and measuring a successful service contract 
could be represented using a scorecard approach.  The balanced scorecard is a planning and 
management tool within government organizations to align activities to the goals and 
objectives of the organization, improve communications, and monitor organization 
performance against goals. The scorecard employs a performance measurement framework 
added to financial metrics to give managers a complete view of organizational performance 
(Monczka et al., 2011). Although important, cost is a lagging indicator of performance and 
not the only determining factor.  The scorecard ensures other related factors (tracking 
schedule and performance) are given proper emphasis in evaluating service contract success.   
Incorporating these standardized definitions and quantifiable measurements in the 
form of a scorecard will mitigate the conflicts that arise due to the differing objectives and 
goals of the various stakeholders within DoD services contracting.    
The PM is an integral member of the IPT and an important stakeholder in the 
contracting process. Every service contract should be evaluated on complexity, and 
evaluators should recognize when a need exists to incorporate a properly trained and 
assignable PM as a key stakeholder (Phillips, 2007).  PMs provide strong communication 
skills and leadership to the entire team.   
An improved application of surveillance and past performance could be implemented.  
For example, the FAR should require a QASP for contracts below the simplified acquisition 
threshold.  Incorporating a QASP will ensure oversight for the majority of service contracts.  
Even though the FAR 15.304 states that past performance should always be evaluated for 
negotiated competitive acquisitions expected to exceed the simplified acquisition threshold, 
CPARS is only required for acquisitions above the $1 million threshold. The CPARS 
threshold should be amended to include contracts below $1 million down to a minimum of 
the simplified acquisition threshold or to a point acceptable to capture the majority of service 
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contracting agencies should include instructions and directives mandating involvement of the 
COR in pre-award phase activities, such as the development of the SOW/PWS.       
J. SUMMARY 
In this chapter we presented and analyzed the data we collected from the research to 
answer the three research questions: 
1. How are successful service contracts within the DoD being defined by 
different stakeholders? 
2. How are service contracts being measured within the DoD by different 
stakeholders? 
3. How should service contracts be defined and measured within theDoD? 
 
We presented conclusions and recommendations based on our analysis.  In the next 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS FOR  
FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
Over the last few decades,  Department of Defense (DoD) contracting has 
experienced increased spending on service contracts. Relative to supply contracts, services 
acquisition has continued to grow in terms both of dollar value and of range of acquisitions. 
Contract obligations rose to over $387 billion in 2008, with nearly $200 billion spent on 
services alone (Hutton & Solis, 2009).  Funding spent on service contracts grew steadily 
from 1990–2010, constituting roughly 42% of the total spending on contracts by the DoD, 
exclusive of research and development services contracts. As such, a standardized approach 
to defining and measuring the success of services contracts is essential.   
The DoD IG and GAO have indicated poorly defined requirements and inadequate 
requirements management as problems in services contracting (GAO, 2007c; DoD IG 2009). 
The GAO has described the DoD’s current approach to services contract management as 
reactive and not fully addressing the key factors of success (GAO, 2007c). DoD IG and GAO 
reports have consistently identified issues in services contract administration and oversight 
(GAO, 2005, 2007a, 2007c; DoD IG, 2009). According to the GAO, the poor management of 
services contracts has undermined the government’s ability to obtain a good value for the 
money spent and contributed to the GAO’s decision to designate contract management a 
high-risk area for the DoD (GAO, 2001, 2007b, 2011).  
The DoD implements cross-functional teams through the use of an Integrated Product 
Team (IPT).  It is useful to note that the IPT is primarily used in contracting for products to 
facilitate the process of meeting cost, performance, and schedule objectives from product 
concept through production, including field support (“IPT,” n.d.).  In service contracting, the 
IPT is a team composed of representatives from appropriate functional disciplines working 
together to identify and resolve issues; make sound, timely recommendations in an effort to 
facilitate decision-making; and build successful programs that meet the warfighter’s needs  




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 56 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli 
With the differing goals, objectives, and responsibilities of the various stakeholders 
(PM, PCO, COR) within DoD services contracting, conflicts arise with regard to how a 
successful service contract is defined and measured by different stakeholders. This conflict is 
explained and understood through stakeholder theory.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Findings 
Our research answered the questions contained in Chapter I:  
1. How are successful service contracts within the DoD defined by different 
stakeholders and what factors are considered in their definitions?  
2. How are service contracts being measured within the DoD by different 
stakeholders? 
3. How should service contracts be defined and measured within the DoD?    
 
We found that there is no standardized definition or measurement for success of 
service contracts. While similarities do exist between the definitions and measures of success 
of a service contract, the weighted value of each factor and metric varies between the 
stakeholders.  Many of the metrics that were established failed to properly address the 
characteristics of S.M.A.R.T., either partially or entirely.   
We discovered that the differing objectives and roles of each stakeholder clearly 
affected the factors that each considered when defining and measuring the success of service 
contracts.  Our research revealed that CORs and PCOs define the factors of a successful 
service contract as staying on schedule, maintaining costs, facilitating communication, and 
having well-defined requirements. Additionally, we discovered CORs and PCOs similarly 
measure a successful service contract by tracking performance, costs, customer satisfaction 
and end user evaluations, and schedule. 
Further, we discovered a lack of properly established PMs within DoD services 
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Additionally, we discovered that no standardized certification process was established and 
required for CORs within services contracting. 
We also discovered that the COR is not always involved in the pre-award phase of 
service contracts and current application of the QASP and CPARS is inadequate. 
2. Recommendations 
A standardized definition of a successful service contract must be implemented, 
incorporating the proper factors with the correct level of emphasis.  Additionally, 
standardized and quantifiable measures must be implemented within DoD services 
contracting.  These measures should align with S.M.A.R.T. metrics and incorporate a more 
objective orientation than currently exists.  Incorporating these standardized definitions and 
quantifiable measurements will mitigate the conflicts that arise due to the differing objectives 
and goals of the various stakeholders within DoD services contracting. Every service contract 
should be evaluated on complexity and evaluators should recognize when a need exists for a 
PM. An improved application of surveillance and past performance should be implemented.  
In order to emphasize COR importance, individual contracting agencies should include 
instructions and directives mandating involvement of the COR in the pre-award phase 
activities, such as development of the SOW/PWS. 
In addition, we suggest utilizing a balanced outcome- and process-oriented approach, 
incorporating the following categories when defining a successful service contract: staying 
on schedule, maintaining costs, facilitating communication, and having well-defined 
requirements.  The standard measure for a successful service contract should incorporate 
solely an outcome-driven approach utilizing the following three metrics: performance, cost 
tracking, and schedule tracking.  These standards for defining and measuring a successful 
service contract could be represented using a balanced scorecard approach.  The balanced 
scorecard is a planning and management tool used by government organizations to align 
activities to the goals and objectives of the organization, improve communications, and 
monitor organization performance against goals.  Incorporating these standardized definitions 
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due to the differing objectives and goals of the various stakeholders within DoD services 
contracting. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Our research participants consisted solely of commands associated with the United 
Sates Navy.  As such, we recommend continuing this research into the various contracting 
commands within the United States Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps.  We were also able 
to incorporate very little data from PMs and contractors within DoD services contracting. We 
recommend that future research incorporate a larger portion of PMs and contractors.  
Additionally, we recommend that future research incorporate greater use of survey tools, 
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